We investigate the influence of investment regulations on the riskiness and procyclicality of defined-benefit (DB) pension funds' asset allocations. We provide a global comparison of the regulatory framework for public, corporate and industry pension funds in the US, Canada and the Netherlands. Derived from panel data analysis of a unique set of close to 600 detailed funds' asset allocations, our results highlight that regulatory factors are vitally important -more so than the funds' individual and institutional characteristics, in shaping these asset allocations. In particular, risk-based capital requirements, balance sheet recognition of unfunded liabilities, lower liability discount rates, and shorter recovery periods lead pension funds to decrease their asset allocation to risky assets. Risk-based capital requirements reduce overall risky asset allocation by as much as 5%, mainly through alternatives. Our empirical results do not corroborate the theoretical predictions that risk-based capital requirements encourage procyclical investment.
Introduction
Regulation of financial institutions is a highly topical issue. Regulators are concerned not only with effective protection of the institutions' stakeholders but also with the potential unintended consequences of regulation. Mechanisms to prevent institutions from insolvency could become an obstacle for long-term or risky investments, subsequently adversely affecting their capacity to finance the real economy.
1 The prolonged deliberation process for regulatory revisions in banking, insurance and pension provision institutions (i.e., Basel II and III, Solvency II, and IORP II, respectively) underscores the difficulty of achieving the objectives of regulation while minimizing the perverse effects.
It is a theoretically established fact that regulatory constraints can shape investors' behavior, often in an unexpected and undesirable manner. Basak and Shapiro (2001) demonstrate that
Value-at-Risk (VaR) constraint lead to larger losses in the worst states of the economy because agents behaving optimally would not insure against these states. Similarly, capital requirements based on VaR assessment induce well-capitalized banks to reduce risk but when in financial distress, banks would switch to a high-risk portfolio (Calem and Rob, 1999; Dangl and Lehar, 2004) . Moreover, risk-based capital requirements are accused of generating procyclical investment behavior (Pennacchi, 2005; Gordy and Howells, 2006; Bec and Gollier, 2009; Repullo and Suarez, 2013; Papaioannou et al., 2013) , especially when solvency buffers are calibrated using risk models estimated on a short history. 2 Apart from VaR, mark-to-market valuation is another regulatory requirement that is believed to distort financial institutions' portfolio choice (Allen and Carletti, 2008) , limit investors' ability to take risk (Severinson and Yermo, 2012) and instigate procyclical investment behavior (Novoa, Scarlata and Solé, 2009 ).
Unfortunately, despite a lively theoretical debate, there is scant empirical evidence about the practical effects of regulation on financial institutions' investments. 3 In this regard, pension funds are a rewarding and instructive field of investigation because in contrast to banking and insurance, there is much less regulatory harmonization across countries. This diversity in the regulatory setup permits the analysis of a wider range of requirements. Until recently, pension funds in many countries, including the US, Canada, many European states and emerging economies, were regulated on the basis of strict investment constraints. Now, however, all these investment rules are being eased and replaced by solvency requirements. Moreover, in 2007 the Netherlands introduced risk-based regulations requiring a solvency capital buffer, similar to the buffers applicable to banks and insurers under Basel III and Solvency II, respectively. In Europe, there are on-going discussions about applying such a framework to all European pension funds (EIOPA, 2012) . As a result, and in contrast to the situation in the banking and insurance industries, pension fund regulation is far from being harmonized. The North American and Dutch In this paper, we seek to determine whether regulation has an impact on pension funds' asset allocation choices. Asset allocation decisions have been shown to be an important source of performance and thus income 4 for pension funds (Brinson et al., 1986 (Brinson et al., , 1991 Munnell and Soto, 2007; Bikker et al., 2011; Aglietta et al., 2012; Andonov et al., 2012; Chambers et al., 2012) . We focus on two important dimensions that have been widely theoretically debated: the extent of risky asset exposure and the procyclicality of investment. In particular, we aim to gauge the economic magnitude of regulatory factors in explaining fund allocation choices, compared with other factors identified so far as the main drivers of pension fund's asset allocation: individual and institutional characteristics of the plans (Chemla, 2005; Rauh, 2009; Dyck and Pomorski, 2011; Crossley and Jametti, 2013, etc.) . With a sizeable database on individual defined-benefit (DB) pension funds' asset allocation in the US, Canada and the Netherlands over a long period , we have a unique opportunity to investigate whether regulatory changes had an impact on their asset allocation choices. 4 Up to 60% of benefits in US public funds are expected to be funded by investment earnings (NASRA, 2014) .
To carry out this investigation, we build a global comparison of the pension regulatory environment of our three countries under study over seven different dimensions. We chronologically map each country's regulatory dimensions by category of funds (i.e., public, corporate and industry). We then test individual, institutional and regulatory determinants of the historical asset allocations of US, Canadian and Dutch pension funds, using the CEM Benchmarking database, which provides detailed information on a large sample of DB funds from these three countries. While there are previous studies that separately examine individual and institutional factors explaining the funds' asset allocations, we are not aware of any study that quantifies the relative importance of these factors, or that examines in as much detail, the wide variety of regulatory options taken by different countries. Moreover, while many papers examine Dutch, US, and to a lesser extent, Canadian pension funds individually, few compare them on a transatlantic basis (e.g., Andonov et al., 2013) . Our unique database enables us to make such a comparison.
Two sets of results emerge from our analysis. First, we show that regulatory factors play a much larger role than individual and institutional factors in explaining the pension funds' allocation to risky assets. Among the regulatory factors, risk-based capital requirements have the largest impact, followed by balance sheet recognition of unfunded liabilities. The former decrease the funds' equity exposures by 5.5% on average, while the latter by 5.1%. Risk-based capital requirements do not have a uniform impact on all risky assets. Real estate, private equity, infrastructure and mortgages are penalized, while commodities are favored. Our results confirm that pension funds' individual and institutional characteristics have a statistically significant impact on their asset allocations (Dyck and Pomorski, 2011; Rauh, 2009; Bikker et al., 2011) but less so than regulatory factors. Funds with younger participants and a higher value of assets under management invest more in risky assets. The presence of a guaranteeing institution, such as the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) in the US, leads to more risky asset allocations.
Second, we build an original measure of investment procyclicality, finding mild evidence that pension funds' investments are procyclical during normal times, but much stronger evidence of procyclicality during turbulence (confirming the pension funds' "bad habits" documented by Ang et al., 2014) . But contrary to theoretical predictions, we discover that regulation has little impact on the procyclicality of asset allocations. Risk-based capital requirements and mark-to-market valuation of assets do not make investment more procyclical. This last, counter-intuitive result may be explained, at least partially, by the fact that the only country in our database with riskbased regulation, the Netherlands, slackened the requirements in response to the subprime crisis, allowing funds to keep or even increase their risky asset exposure.
There is a large literature trying to assess the determinants of pension funds' allocation choices. Bodie (1987) shows that for a DB fund with only guaranteed nominal benefits, pure accrued liability hedging would be accomplished by investing the fund's wealth entirely in nominal bonds. However, the dynamic nature of the funds' obligations requires taking into account not just the accrued liabilities but also the obligations associated with expected future accruals. In practice, DB pension funds invest a substantial proportion of their wealth in risky assets, especially equities, and, to a lesser extent in alternatives and risky fixed income securities.
Part of this risky asset investment may be explained by the positive correlation of risky assets, especially stocks, to wage growth (Sundaresan and Zapatero, 1997; Peskin, 2001; Lucas and Zeldes, 2006) . However, the fact that pension funds' risky asset allocation depends on their characteristics (e.g., public or private), and that it changes dramatically over time, 5 suggests that hedging wage growth is not the only explanation. Funds' individual characteristics, notably their size and the structure of their liabilities (maturity, inflation indexing), have been stressed as major determinants of the riskiness of pension plan asset allocations. Chemla (2005) and Dyck and Pomorski (2011) find that larger plans have higher allocations to alternative investments, whereas Rauh (2009) and Bikker et al. (2011) find a positive and significant relationship between risktaking and the share of active employees in the plan.
The institutional characteristics of the plans, such as the presence of a guarantee mechanism, may also have an influence on the fund's risk-taking behavior. Most corporate DB funds in the US, as well as Canadian pension funds in Ontario, are insured by a pension benefit guarantee fund. 6 This insurance, which partly covers funding shortfalls for the pension plans of bankrupt firms, provides a put option that reduces the negative impact of pension liabilities on the firm's value to shareholders. Sharpe (1976) , Treynor (1977) and Bodie (1990) demonstrate that underfunding and allocating investments to risky assets can maximize the value of this option.
There is some evidence that funds do behave as if they are maximizing the value of the put option (Nielson and Chan, 2007; Crossley and Jametti, 2013). 7 Finally, in addition to individual characteristics and the institutional setup, the regulatory environment may also influence the willingness of funds to invest in risky assets. Very few academic papers have dealt with this dimension so far, and those that have tend to focus on how the choice of the liability discount rate affects funds' asset allocations. In the US there is disagreement on the way pension liabilities should be valued. Public pension funds are subject to the actuarial approach of the Government Accounting Standard Board (GASB) and therefore discount future retirement payments with the expected rate of return on the plan assets, whereas private funds use a market rate. Pennachi and Rastad (2011) point out that among US public funds, those selecting higher discount rates were also those choosing riskier portfolios. Andonov et al. (2013) add to this by comparing the asset allocations and liability discount rate of public funds in the US with private funds in the US, and with public and private funds in Canada and Europe. They provide empirical evidence that US public funds increased their allocation to riskier investment strategies in order to maintain high discount rates and present lower liabilities, especially those funds with a higher proportion of retired members. But other dimensions of pension regulation, such as funding constraints, mark-to-market valuation of assets, and riskbased capital requirements, may potentially have an impact on pension fund investments as well.
Our results expand previous empirical investigation by providing the first comprehensive empirical evidence on the theoretically debated questions of regulatory impact on pension funds' 6 The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) in the US and the Pension Benefits Guarantee Fund (PBGF) in Canada ensure the payment of pension benefits if a sponsor becomes insolvent. The PBGC, for instance, collects an annual insurance premium per plan participant, plus a variable rate premium for underfunded plans. 7 Love et al. (2011) show that the particular form of pension insurance (where the insurance premium is underpriced and is a function of the pension plan's underfunding) often pushes firms towards one of two extremes-either maximizing the risk in the pension promise by reducing contributions and mismatching assets and liabilities, or minimizing the risk in the pension promise by fully funding future benefits and investing in assets designed to match the liabilities as closely as possible. Incentives for moral hazard may be nevertheless offset by a few factors: for instance, companies with strongly performing business lines would prefer to remain solvent and fund their pension plans.
asset allocation. It shows that regulatory choices matter in shaping the investment decisions of pension plans. We hope that our insights can contribute to the academic discussion on the optimal design of pension regulation and assist regulators and practitioners in their efforts to develop a framework for a sound pension industry.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a comparison of the changes in the pension regulatory environment in the US, Canada and the Netherlands since 1990, Section 3 describes our data and methodology, Section 4 discusses our empirical results on the major drivers of pension investment asset allocation (riskiness and procyclicality), Section 5 concludes.
Overview of Pension Regulatory Environment
Unlike insurance companies and banks, pension funds are not subject to harmonized prudential regulation but are governed by highly heterogeneous rules that differ not only between countries but also within them. We focus on two sets of regulations that influence pension fund investments: the budgeting and funding rules of the fund, and the financial reporting standards of the sponsor (i.e., accounting rules). For US private, Canadian and Dutch pension plans, these two sets of regulations are distinct and determined by separate regulatory authorities. In contrast, US public funds are bound solely by regulations on reporting and by lax funding regulation.
United States
In the US, public and private pension funds are not regulated under the same rules or by the same regulatory authority. For public funds, the standards for both accounting and funding were set in 1984 in Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) Statement 25 and in Actuarial
Standards of Practice (ASOP) 27. The GASB standard allows an actuarial valuation of funds' assets 8 and discounting of their liabilities using the expected rate of return on pension plan assets.
As pointed out by Brown and Wilcox (2009) 9 Single-employer plans are retirement plans that are administered by one employer only. Multi-employer plans are collectively bargained plans maintained by labor unions and more than one employer. A board of trustees with equal representation of employers and labor manages them. This type of arrangement is common in industries that are typically unionized and characterized by frequent job switching, such as construction, entertainment, trucking, and mining. 10 Under PPA, the discount rate for single-employer plans is a two-year average of investment-grade corporate bonds (i.e., AAA, AA and A). The rates are three-tiered (i.e., 5, 5-15, and more than 15 years) to match the duration of plans' liabilities. PPA shortened the averaging period of the discount rate from four to two years. 11 Fair value requires the assessment of the price that is fair between two specific parties, taking into account the respective advantages or disadvantages that each will gain from the transaction. Market value may meet this criteria, but this is not necessarily be the case. accrued pension costs must firms recognize the unfunded ABO as an additional minimum liability. Amir and Benartzi (1998) find that firms on the borderline between disclosure and recognition modify their funds' asset allocation to reduce the probability of facing a pension deficit, and they do so by investing in more bonds than stocks. FAS 158 became effective on December 15, 2006, making it mandatory to always recognize the plans' funded status on the 12 PBO is the actuarial present value of future pension benefits accrued from past service years. Future events such as compensation increases, turnover and mortality are taken into consideration. 13 In contrast to PBO, ABO is an estimate of a company's pension liability under the view that the plan is terminated on the date the calculation is performed.
balance sheet. 14 The requirement to report any unfunded liabilities, with liabilities determined as PBO, is stricter than the ABO standard under FAS 87.
Canada
In Canada, there is much less regulatory distinction between private and public pension Accounting Board PS 4000 standards.
The Netherlands
Unlike the US, the Netherlands makes no regulatory distinction between funds covering public or private sector workers; and unlike Canada, it has no provincial regulatory boundaries. financial requirements. 17 The FTK outlines regulations concerning the liability discount rate (i.e., swap rate), confirms the requirement for mark-to market asset valuation (as was already the case under the predecessor to the FTK) and sets capital buffers to ensure, with a 97.5% confidence level, that funds' assets will not be less than the level of liabilities within a year. If funds fail to meet this condition, they are granted a three-year timeframe to meet the minimum solvency requirements and up to fifteen years to recoup the buffer requirements. Among the three countries under study, the Netherlands is the only one to have put in place risk-based capital requirements similar to those that will apply in Europe for insurance companies, and that are under discussion for pension plans. Table 1 below summarizes the main differences between the regulations governing US, Canadian and Dutch funds since 1990. The different forms of regulation can be classified under three dimensions: (1) investment restrictions, e.g., quantitative limits on certain categories of investment (usually risky assets); (2) valuation requirements, both for assets (e.g., mark-tomarket valuation, with or without smoothing, actuarial valuation) and for liabilities (discount rate allowed, recognition of unfunded liabilities in the State's or sponsor's balance sheet); and (3) funding requirements, e.g., rules requiring a minimum level of funding requirements, risk-based capital requirements, allowance of a recovery period in case of underfunding.
Comparing Regulations
Insert Table 1 about here 18 More precisely, the discrepancy between the premium payment due and paid, the deficit provision, if any, and the recognition of asset from advance payments or any surplus. RJ 271 (2002) accounting requirements were thought to provide little transparency on funds' asset and liabilities. See Swinkels (2011) for more discussion on the implication of IAS 19 for Dutch pension fund sponsors. 19 Dutch occupational pension funds are independent trusts. Since the governing board comprises equal representation of employers and unions, the employer does not have exclusive power on decision-making, and is not solely responsible for any underfunding (Bovenberg and Nijman, 2009 
Data and Methodology

Data Description
Our data is sourced from CEM Benchmarking, a Toronto-based provider of performance benchmarking services to leading pension funds around the globe. To our knowledge, this is the broadest database on pension fund asset allocation worldwide. We carry out our analysis on an unbalanced panel of 589 funds: 377 in the US, 174 in Canada and 38 in the Netherlands, over the 1991-2011 period. 20 The value of assets under management of these funds amount to 35% of all DB funds in the US, 32% in Canada, and 30% in the Netherlands in 2011. 21 There is no evidence of self-reporting bias in our database (Dyck and Pomorsky, 2011), 22 as the data are anonymous. Insert Table 2 20 Pension funds in the database are classified into three categories: public, private, and other (mainly composed of multi-employer funds, also known as "union" or "Taft-Hartley" funds in the US, and "industry" funds in the Netherlands). Preserving only the funds with all required information, and at least two observations over the time period (i.e., in order to apply within transformation in panel regression), we analyze 60% of the funds in the database. 21 This proportion is derived from comparison of pension assets in 2011 (Towers Watson Global Pension Asset Study 2012). Funds using CEM's benchmarking service tend to be large . 22 The difference between the performance of plans that skip reporting for one year and that of plans that continue reporting is small and not statistically different from zero. 23 This is the first year when there is at least one observation for each type of fund in every country. Dutch funds are less numerous compared with US or Canadian funds in the first half of 1990s. 24 Fully funded long-only segregated asset pool dedicated to tactical asset allocation. 
Variable Construction
There are various ways to measure the riskiness of the asset allocation, the most direct method being to measure the volatility of the funds' portfolios. Unfortunately, with only annual data on pension funds' returns, we are unable to assess the dynamics of risk. We thus measure the riskiness of the asset allocation as the percentage of the global portfolio dedicated to risky assets, overall and in three sub-categories: equities, risky fixed income and alternatives. 28 We follow this definition and consider that investors are procyclical if they are buying risky assets when market prices rise and selling them when they fall, thus potentially exaggerating market movements.
We define an original measure of procyclicality of pension fund investment that compares the sign of a fund's net purchase of buying in risky asset j with that of the market return that year.
Our procyclicality measure for asset class j, is set to one if the sign of net buying in asset class j during year t is similar to that of the market return that year, and zero otherwise.
" is fund i's allocation in a risky asset (sub-)class j at time t, ' is the total return of fund i at time t, is the return of the risky asset class j in the portfolio of fund i at time t, 29 is the market return at time t, approximated by the return on the MSCI World. 30 Net purchase, ℎ , of fund i in asset class j is measured as the difference between the actual weights of the funds and the funds' estimated would-be risky asset weights if the past year's weights were allowed to drift along with market performance (a no-rebalancing or asset-drift strategy).
The reasoning behind the definition of is best illustrated with an example. Suppose that the market return at time t is positive, >0. If a fund i's actual weight in asset class j, " is higher than the asset drift weights, then it suggests that there is an inflow of investment to that asset class. This is procyclical investment behavior according to our definition. The reasoning 28 For institutional investors, Papaioannou al. (2013) define procyclicality as momentum behavior. 29 Since much of the data on the asset class breakdown of individual pension funds' returns is missing, we recompose the risky asset portfolio return of each fund by using the weighted average performance of selected benchmarks, the weights being equal to those reported by the fund. For equities, we used the following geographical benchmarks from MSCI: US, Canada, Netherlands, Australia, UK, World ex-Australia and World ex-US, ACWI ex-US. Risky fixed income benchmarks are the Barclays US Corporate High Yield bond index and BofA US Mortgage. For alternatives, we used S&P GSCI, NAREIT index, UBS global infrastructure, NCREIF property, timberland and farmland indices, and HFRIWI for hedge funds. 30 We conducted robustness checks with alternative definitions of market returns (equally weighted set of indices corresponding to the asset subcategories in the database), with similar results.
behind adverse asset price movements is similar. Figure 1 (2013), who report procyclical behavior by US funds during the same period.
We consider three types of explanatory factors: regulatory variables, funds' individual characteristics, and institutional characteristics. 31 Table 3 describes the explanatory variable construction, and presents the expected effects inferred from economic theory on the riskiness and procyclicality of asset allocations.
Insert Table 3 about here
We define our quantitative restriction variable (QIR) as the sum over all restricted assets of (1-asset weight restriction). 32 Tighter limits or a higher number of restricted assets yield a higher QIR. Quantitative investment restrictions, if binding, would naturally lead to lower allocations in the asset classes concerned. Since they are stated as a fixed percentage of the asset value, these 31 Despite being one of the most comprehensive sources of international pension fund data, the CEM Benchmarking database does not contain funding status. In addition to the anonymity of the participating funds in the database, this critical information cannot be recovered and is thus omitted in the analysis, 32 Before 2010, Canada imposed separate restriction on both natural resources and Canadian natural resources. As our data does not permit the distinction between Canadian natural resources from overall natural resources, we consider only the 25% limit on real estate and natural resources.
restrictions -if binding -are also likely to encourage countercyclical investment behavior among funds when prices go up (forced selling during bullish times).
We consider three types of valuation requirements. We define the asset valuation variable (AssetVal) as 1, 0.5, or 0, depending on whether fair valuation is strictly imposed, smoothing is allowed, or further discretion is permitted, for both the funding and accounting requirements. As both regulations may have an impact on the funds' behavior, we take the average of the two measures. Mark-to-market valuation limits investors' ability to take risk (Severinson and Yermo, 2012) , amplifies funds' sensitivity to short-term changes in financial returns; , and encourages procyclical investment behavior (Novoa, Scarlata and Solé, 2009 ). Second, we consider the liability discount rate (LDR) disclosed by the funds. If funds are allowed to apply a rate that is dependent on the riskiness of their investments, they may be encouraged to invest more heavily in risky assets (Pennachi and Rastad, 2011; Andonov et al., 2013) . Third, we define a variable accounting for the recognition of the funded status of the fund in the sponsor's (or government's) balance sheet. LiabRecog is defined as 1, if the liabilities to be recognized include expected increases in accrued benefits, 0.5 if only accrued benefits are taken into account, and 0 otherwise.
The gradient reflects the level of the liabilities recognition requirement. Sponsors required to recognize underfunded liabilities on their balance sheet may be compelled to reduce risky asset allocation in order to minimize balance sheet volatility (Amir et al., 2010) . This incentive is likely to be stronger in stressed markets, so the recognition requirement may also induce procyclicality.
Three types of funding requirements are considered. Funding is the minimum funding requirement in percentage. A higher funding requirement is likely to decrease the funds' risky asset exposure. There is abundant empirical evidence showing that underfunded plans tend to take less investment risk, whereas well-funded ones invest more in risky assets (e.g., Rauh, 2009; de Dreu and Bikker, 2012; . This implies that when the funding requirement becomes more stringent, more funds are likely to be underfunded, and hence, risky asset exposure might decline on average. In all cases, fixed requirements could lead funds to cut their risky asset exposure when markets go down, leading to procyclicality, especially when mark-to-market valuation is adopted. The presence of risk-based capital requirements (RBCR) is accounted for through a dummy variable equal to one when risk-based capital buffers are mandatory. The requirement to hold higher capital buffers for risky assets is expected to make investment in risky assets less attractive. It could cause funds to be more sensitive to market cycles, and hence to invest procyclically (Adrian and Bec and Gollier, 2009 ). Finally, we take into account the length of the recovery period (in years) allowed in case of underfunding (Recovery).
If granted a longer period, plans would be able to invest more in risky assets and have fewer incentives to behave procyclically.
The effects of funds' individual characteristics on their investments are well known. We thus control for plans' heterogeneous characteristics, namely the different maturities of the funds (Maturity), defined as the percentage of retired members; the presence of varying inflation indexation mechanisms (Inf Indx is the percentage of indexed benefits); and the size of the funds (assets under management in billions of US dollars). More mature funds, and funds that do not index pensions on inflation have incentives to take less risk in their asset allocation (Lucas and Zeldes, 2006; Rauh, 2009; Bikker et al., 2011) . Since larger funds are able to hire specialists with expertise in more complex asset classes, they are also likelier to have a higher allocation to alternative assets (Dyck and Pomorski, 2011). Finally, as an institutional characteristic, we take into account the presence of a collective insurance mechanism provided by a guarantee fund. Our
Guarantee variable is defined as a dummy variable equal to one if there is a collective guarantee.
The existence of a safety net that partly covers funding shortfalls for the plans operated by bankrupt firms may tempt pension plans to take greater investment risks (Nielson and Chan, 2007;  Crossley and Jametti, 2013).
Methodology
We seek to explain funds' risk-taking by means of regulatory factors and fund characteristics using an unbalanced panel of fund level data over time. Our regression model is specified as such: " = ) + * % +,-+ * . /00 123 + * 4 56-+ * 7 5829-:; + * < = >8 ; + * ? -@ -+ * A -:B C + * D E2 8 C + * F , G , >H + * %I J8K +L
" is the percentage invested in risky assets (globally or on each subcategory: equities, risky fixed income, alternative investments) by fund 8 in year , +,-is the index measuring strictness of quantitative investment restrictions, /00 123 is the asset valuation method for funding requirements, 56-is the self-reported liability discount rate, 5829-:; is the requirement to recognize liabilities in excess of the PBO or equivalent, and = >8 ; is the minimum funding requirements. -@ -is the risk-based capital requirements and -:B C is the recovery period. E2 8 C refers to the percentage of retired members, , G , >H is the percentage of members' benefits contractually indexed to inflation, J8K is the value in billions of US dollars of funds' assets under management.
We postulate that the error term L in (3) consists of the fixed effects of Fund and Year.
Fund level fixed effects mitigate all possible biases due to fund heterogeneity that is constant over time. Year-specific effects, such as systemic global financial market fluctuations that affect all the funds considered, are taken into account by Year fixed effects. As the data is unbalanced, Year fixed effects also mitigate the irregular number of plans each year. The Hausman test supports our choice for fixed rather than random effects.
With the data structured along multi-levels, e.g., country, type (public, private, industry) and fund, there are numerous possible assumptions for the fixed effects that could be included in the specification. We start by presenting the fixed effects on the lowest granularity possible, i.e., Fund and Year. We introduce a robustness check by replacing the Fund fixed effect by the Type fixed effects. Unfortunately, all of these specifications preclude us from investigating what impact a guaranteeing institution would have. Therefore, we also test the baseline specification of a pooled regression with no fixed effects, and another with only Year fixed effects. 33 We present errors that are clustered by year. 34 Estimated Fund, Type, Country, and Year fixed effects are not reported. 33 These specifications with coarser granularity for fixed-effect levels permit the addition of an indicator variable, M 2 2 , that is one for fund types in countries where a collective guarantee fund exists. We present these results for overall risky assets only. 34 Year clustering allows residuals to be correlated across funds in each year. We cluster only by year because the data's cross-sectional size is considerably larger than the time dimension. When clustering, we adopt the guideline in Thomson (2011) , i.e., we cluster along the dimension with fewer observations. We investigate funds' procyclical investment behavior using a generalized linear logit model, as in (4). 35 Our specification choice is the logit analogy of the specification (3) Table 4 1-x) ) is canonical. It implicitly assumes a direct connection between the explanatory variables and the probability that a fund is procyclical. 36 We omit the Fund level fixed effects because it would entail estimation of every Fund and Year fixed effectsclose to 600 parameters. Within transformation cannot be applied to the logit model. An alternative to preserve specification with Fund and Year fixed effects is the linear mixed effect logit model, whereby the fixed effects are assumed to be random, i. ). Results from the estimation of this model do not yield material changes to our conclusion and thus are not presented here.
Major Drivers of Pension Investment Behavior
Allocation to risky assets
real estate, private equity, hedge funds) and the risky fixed income (high yield and mortgages) space respectively, under the specification with Fund and Year fixed effects.
37
Insert We find that regardless of the specification used for the regression, regulatory variables have a highly significant impact on asset allocation choices, ranging (in absolute terms) from 0.03% to 5.5% respectively when we adopt the specification with Fund and Year fixed effects. We consistently find across all regressions that the impact of regulatory variables is at least similar in amplitude, and in many instances even higher, than the impact of funds' individual and institutional characteristics.
Risk-based capital requirements, unique to the Netherlands since 2007 among all the countries in our dataset, yield a 5.5% reduction in the overall allocation to risky assets on average. This is the regulatory factor with the largest economic impact. While the effect of risk-based capital requirements is negative on overall risky asset exposure (Table 4) , it is non-significant for equities, but economically and statistically important for alternatives (-3.1%) . Surprisingly, it is associated with an increase in commodities (+1.1%, see Table 5 ). The contrasting implications of this regulatory requirement may be linked to the relative capital charges of these different asset classes under the Dutch FTK, by risk modules. While these capital charges are 25% for risks associated with listed equities in mature markets (35% for those in emerging markets), they are 30% for commodities. 38 As risks stemming from equities and commodities face comparable capital charges, if expected returns are identical or even higher for commodities, this would explain the preference for commodities.
Recognizing unfunded liabilities on the sponsor's balance sheet has the next highest impact on pension funds' asset allocation, yielding a 5.1% decrease in the funds' risky asset allocation, almost equally spread between equities (-2.7%) and alternatives (-2.3%). 39 The requirement to recognize unfunded liabilities in excess of PBO increases the volatility of the sponsor's balance sheet, inducing funds to shift their asset allocation to safer, less volatile assets. Minimum funding requirements have little economic impact on risky asset allocations. Increasing the minimum funding requirement by a standard deviation (i.e., 40.5%), yields a reduction of 0.03 × 40.5 = 1.2% in the allocation to risky assets. This is consistent with the reasoning that because underfunded funds tend to invest less in risky assets, a higher funding requirement could only increase the number of underfunded funds, thus yielding an overall negative impact on risky asset allocation. Additionally, imposing a shorter recovery period significantly reduces the funds' risky asset allocation. A standard deviation decrease in the recovery period (corresponding to 12 years) yields on average a reduction of 0.12 × 12=1.44% in risky asset allocation.
Funds with higher liability discount rates allocate more to risky assets. A standard deviation increase in the discount rate premium (corresponding to 1.3%) leads to a 0.49 × 1.3=0.6%
increase in the weights assigned to risky assets (especially private equity). Our results confirm the findings of Andonov et al. (2013) and emphasize the importance of the choice of liability discount rate in the pension fund's allocation. Public funds in the US, which are now much less constrained than domestic corporate funds but also than other funds in the rest of the world, tend to allocate more to risky assets. But it is also interesting to put this result into perspective. The choice of the discount rate, although important, is not the regulatory dimension with the largest economic impact on funds' actual asset allocation.
Lower quantitative restrictions are estimated to yield higher overall investments into risky assets, especially risky fixed income and alternatives. These restrictions were imposed in Canada in the 1990s on two particular alternative asset classes: real estate and natural resources, as well as foreign assets. 40 In Table 5 , we observe that investment restrictions have a significantly negative impact on infrastructure, 41 and no significant impact on real estate or commodities.
42
The positive global impact of investment restrictions on the overall risky asset allocation is 39 Especially infrastructure, real estate and private equity. 40 Exposure to these asset classes could be gained through equities, infrastructures, commodities and real estate. 41 Natural resources could be partly included in that category. 42 This last result is consistent with the fact that the restrictions were probably non-binding on these asset classes over our sample, since funds allocate significantly less in practice than the stated constraint.
driven by the significant positive impact of restrictions on non-restricted risky assets (high yield bonds, private equity and hedge funds). This supports the idea that funds, being restricted to invest in some risky asset classes, reallocate to other risky assets due to the constraint.
Among individual characteristics, fund size has the largest statistically significant impact on the risky asset allocation. A standard deviation increase in the value of assets under management, corresponding to $20 billion, is associated with an allocation that is 2.1% larger for risky assets overall, and in particular, 1.6% larger for alternatives (infrastructure, real estate and private equity) and 0.36% for risky fixed income (especially mortgages). The size of the pension fund has a substantially larger influence on the allocation to alternatives than to any other asset subclass. This confirms the fact that larger funds are also the most sophisticated and have more resources to hire competent professionals with expertise in monitoring complicated assets such as hedge funds, infrastructure or private equity. A standard deviation increase in the percentage of retired members (corresponding to 18%) is estimated to entail a 0.09 × 18 = 1.6% decrease in risky asset allocation, particularly equities. Our results are consistent with those of Bikker et al. (2011) , who demonstrate that maturity differences are an important factor explaining the variability of asset allocation among plans. Fund size and maturity have a fairly consistent influence on overall risky asset allocation regardless of the specification. We also find that funds with one standard deviation higher inflation-indexed contracts allocate as much as 41 × 0.01 = 0.41% more to alternatives, and 41 × 0.005 = 0.21% to real estate. This is consistent with the fact that funds tend to use alternative assets to hedge inflation (Amenc et al., 2009) . Despite empirical evidence supporting the inflation-hedging potential of equities over a long investment horizon (Boudoukh and Richardson, 1993; Schotman and Schweizer, 2000) , we find no conclusive results on funds' tendencies to allocate more to equities when they offer more inflation indexing.
The presence of a guarantee fund tends to have a positive and significant impact on the riskiness of the asset allocation. This result is in line with the theoretical results of Sharpe (1976) and Treynor (1977) and also with recent empirical evidence (Nielson and Chan, 2007; Crossley and Jametti, 2013) showing that funds tend to tolerate more underfunding, and thus allocate more to risky assets, when an insurance mechanism is present. 43 The global explanatory power of the regression specifications is commendable, ranging from 4-10% under the Fund and Year fixed effects with within-transformation and 19-27% under the Country, Type and Year fixed effects. Table 7 presents the results of the logit regressions with Year, Country and Type fixed effects on our procyclicality measure , with c representing overall risky assets or their subclasses:
Procyclicality
equities, risky fixed income and alternatives. Funds having quantitative investment restrictions display greater procyclical behavior in their risky asset investments, especially equities. A 5% increase in restrictions implies a 22% higher probability of being procyclical. Larger funds tend to be more procyclical in risky fixed income. But the effect is rather small. A standard deviation increase in fund size (i.e., by 20 billion USD) yields an increase of less than 0.01 in the probability of being procyclical.
Perhaps most surprising is the fact that imposing risk-based capital requirements is not associated with greater procyclicality across all risky asset investments. This result contradicts theoretical predictions (Adrian and Bec and Gollier, 2009 ) that using risk models estimated on a short history to calibrate solvency buffers (as introduced in the Netherlands in 2007) generates procyclical investment behavior.
Insert Table 7 about here
The lack of convincing evidence of any procyclical behavior among Dutch pension funds could be attributed to regulatory slackening in the Netherlands in response to the subprime crisis.
The Dutch pension supervisory authority, De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), announced numerous waivers to the standing regulation in order to help pension funds recover. These alternative 43 Whether a fund's participation in a guarantee fund (e.g., PBGC in the US or PBGF in Ontario, Canada) influences its exposure to financial risk cannot be fully investigated in our setup due to the lack of information on the sponsor and funds' liabilities. Viewing the PBGC guarantee as a put option, its value would depend on the price of this option, the estimation of which would require information on the amount guaranteed, premium, and assumptions on the sponsor's probability of default, value of liabilities, etc. 
Conclusion
Amidst ongoing discussions about applying a framework similar to Solvency II in Europe to occupational pensions, an intense debate is underway on how regulatory changes might change institutional investors' asset allocations. Although various theoretical papers discuss the potential impact of mark-to-market valuation and risk-based capital requirements on financial institutions' ability to take risk and on the procyclicality of their investments, there is scant empirical evidence at present. Our paper attempts to fill this gap by means of a detailed analysis of pension funds'
allocations, based on a sizeable database of DB funds in three countries: the United States, Canada and the Netherlands. These countries are particularly interesting because they are diverse in their regulatory approaches and also undertook pension reforms at different points in time. The Our empirical results highlight that regulation has at least as much, and in many instances even more influence on asset allocation choices as do pension funds' individual characteristics (maturity, size, inflation indexation) and institutional characteristics (presence of a guaranteeing mechanism). Among the different regulatory options, we find that risk-based capital requirements and recognition of unfunded liabilities on the sponsor's balance sheet have the largest impact, the two measures together reduce the share allocated to risky assets by more than 10%. Interestingly, quantitative risk-based capital requirements lead to a decrease in real estate, mortgages, and private equity, but an increase in commodities. In our opinion, this result is particularly important for regulators. They seem to have imposed constraints that make certain alternative investments more attractive, and others less so. Lastly, risk-based capital requirements are not found to have a statistically significant link to procyclicality, in contrast to the belief conveyed by theoretical studies, possibly because of coincident slackening of other regulatory standards.
Annual data frequency limits our analysis of procyclicality. Furthermore, data availability issues restrict our study to only three countries. A more thorough look at European countries, while challenging, would be a highly interesting refinement. Market interest rate at the measurement date on highquality debt instruments (e.g., AA corporate bonds) with cash flow that matches the timing and amount of the expected benefit payments, or interest rate inherent in the amount at which the accrued benefit obligation could be settled.
When corporate bond rates do not extend far enough into the future, government bond rates can be used.
For funding:
Before 2007: PSW Fixed actuarial interest rate with a prescribed maximum. If no indexation is provided, then >4% is allowed, otherwise lower than 4%.
Since 2007: FTK Yield curve that is based on the euro swap curve as set by the DNB.
Table 2: Summary Statistics
This table provides summary statistics for pension funds' returns, asset allocation and characteristics, by country and by type in the US. The total number of funds and observations is presented in Panel A. Panels B and C present the following data for 1996 and 2011 respectively: mean (and standard deviations in parenthesis) of the size in billions USD, maturity (i.e., the % of retired members), the extent to which members benefits are indexed to inflation, liability discount rate used, total annual return, % allocated to risky assets and its subcategories (i.e., equities, risky fixed income assets and alternative assets). The presence of an insurance fund allows higher allocation to risky assets + ≈ IV As the data does not permit the distinction between Canadian natural resources from overall natural resources, we consider only the 25% restriction on real estate and natural resources. V The rates for accounting purposes are also available for 50% of the funds in the database. Since US public funds have only one set of regulations that governs funding and reporting (GASB), the disclosed liability discount rate and expected rate of return are identical for 93% of the funds. VI Projected Benefit Obligation. VII Accumulated Benefit Obligation. VIII Dutch funds' "65-x" funding requirement is estimated using min { , 5 % is the log likelihood of the estimated model. 5 I is the log likelihood of the null model with only the constant term.
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Figure 1: Time Series of Asset Drift Procyclicality Measure By Countries Figure 1 shows the average of the procyclicality measure, PC noo p q f nqqS q , over funds in each year. The higher the measure, the more the funds in a particular country exhibit procyclical behavior.
